



policy of the courts to give a liberal construction to pro se habeas petitions.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *United States v. Otero*, 502 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007) (“we construe pro se pleadings liberally.”) (citing *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Nevertheless, “a district court is authorized to dismiss a [habeas] petition summarily when it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court[.]” *Lonchar v. Thomas*, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996).


A habeas petition, in this context, seeks release from immigration detention. As a general matter, in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) “limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689. To state a habeas claim under § 2241, the petitioner must provide facts showing good reason to believe that there is no reasonable likelihood of his actual removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

Mr. Dunbar, however, is no longer in immigration detention. He represents to the Court in his letter, received March 10, 2017, that he has already been removed from the United States to Jamaica. The Court’s review of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement online detainee locator confirms that Mr. Dunbar is no longer in immigration detention. *See <https://locator.ice.gov/odls/searchByAlienNumber.do>* (last visited on March 16, 2017). In short, Mr. Dunbar has received the relief he seeks in his habeas petition; he is no longer in immigration detention. Nor is there any reasonable probability of his being placed in immigration detention again, since he is no longer in the United States. Accordingly, his habeas petition seeking his release from immigration detention is moot as he “has achieved the result he sought in his habeas

petition and his change in circumstances has ‘forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.’” *Nunes v. Decker*, 480 F. App’x 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting *Artway v. Att’y Gen.*, 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 1996)) (other citation omitted); *see also Lindaastuty v. Attorney General of United States*, 186 F. App’x 294, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (habeas petition challenging immigration detention is moot due to deportation from the United States); *Tjandra v. Ashcroft*, 110 F. App’x 290 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding appeal from denial of habeas petition that challenged immigration custody while petition for review was pending moot in light of petitioner’s removal from the United States); *Pinoth v. Holder*, No. 14-1803, 2015 WL 2015 WL 404489, at \*1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2015) (denying habeas petition that raised *Zadvydas* claim as moot where petitioner was removed from the United States); *Nguyen v. Holder*, No. 13-0838, 2013 WL 5728671, at \*1-2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2013) (same).

For the foregoing reasons, the habeas petition will be dismissed as moot. An appropriate order will be entered.

DATED: March 17, 2017

  
KEVIN MCNULTY  
United States District Judge